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I started following the attempts to detect gravitational waves (GW) using terrestrial detectors 
shortly after the business started in the 1960s.  My fieldwork began in 1972 and I have been 
pursuing the subject ever since.  The first (1975) paper I wrote about GW set out what I 
would later (1985) call ‘the experimenter’s regress’.  It argued that, on its own, replicating the 
experiments could not prove whether some claimed phenomenon was real or not.  This was 
because one could not tell whether the replicating experiments had been performed 
adequately.  Because experiment is a skilful business and depends on tacit knowledge, the 
only reliable way of knowing whether an experiment has been properly carried out is to 
examine the results but if the right results from such an experiment are what is in question 
then there is no reliable criterion and the argument about whose experiments were good and 
whose were poor can go on for ever.  In later work I tried to show that Joe Weber’s early 
claims were killed, not just by the negative results of others but by the determined efforts of 
certain scientists to get everyone to agree about how to divide the whole set of experiments 
into competent and incompetent. 
Over the nearly half-century of terrestrial GW detection work up to 2015 there have been 
about half-a-dozen claims to have seen the waves with detectors more sensitive than Weber’s 
but all of them have led to fierce arguments and eventual consignment to the waste-bin of 
scientific history.  I’ve described them in my 2004 book and shown how each of them 
illustrates the problem of the experimenter’s regress.  I’ve also described, in 2011 and 2013, 
two passages of analysis of fake data, known as the ‘Equinox Event’ and ‘Big Dog’; these 
were ‘blind injections’ deliberately but secretly inserted into the huge interferometers to 
cause the scientists to practice and rehearse their skills in preparation for the real thing.  In 
these cases I showed that the data by itself was not decisive because the analysis rested on a 
whole raft of philosophical assumptions or taken-for-granted procedures the validity of which 
could not be proved by calculation or logic so even though the injected data should have been 
decisive (if fake) the process of reaching an agreement about what it meant involved social 
agreement.   
Though in my early work I thought what I was doing was proving something about the nature 
of the physical world – that it was a ‘social construct’ – by 1981 I reached the conclusion that 
no such thing could be proved.  All I could show was that Nature or the data that was taken to 
represent Nature, was not decisive in the short term so long as there were scientists ready to 
argue against any particular interpretation; data is ‘interpretatively flexible’.  But whether our 
long term conclusions are forced on us by something like Nature’s ‘hidden hand’ we do not 
know.  By 1981 the conclusion I had reached was simply that though we could not know 
whether realism was true or not, we could know that it was fatal to the social analysis of 
science.  The question asked by the social analyst of science is: “Why do scientists believe 
‘p’ rather than ‘not-p’ and how do they come to this belief?”  If the trump of reality is always 
up the sleeve of the analyst there is little chance that the question will be pushed to the limit 
because social inquiry can be trumped anytime the analyst fancies: ‘Scientists came to 
believe this because it is true, rational, or whatever.’  Thus, since 1981 my position has been 
‘methodological relativism’ in which reality-trumps are not allowed. (See also Collins 2015 
for a discussion of this in the context of the scientific realism debate.) 
Now, the question is, how does the wonderful event of September 14th 2015 affect all of this?  
I have already indicated the problem by calling it ‘a wonderful event’ rather than ‘the bit of 
interpretively flexible data that turned up on September 14th’ and I’ll now make things worse.  
I learned of the event on a Monday evening from my regular scanning of the scientists’ 
emails; this was just a few hours after it was first seen.  As with most of the other scientists, I 
at first assumed it was just another of the many false alarms which afflict such a sensitive 
apparatus.  But by Thursday morning I had concluded it was the ‘real thing’ and I had started 
to write the book I knew I was going to have to write (Gravity’s Kiss should be out in the 
spring).  The real thing!  How can I say such a thing? 
Well, the reason I have chosen to spend more than 40 years immersed with a group of 
scientists is because I like the scientists and I love the completely crazy project: to try to spot 
cosmic events by recording changes down to 1/10,000 of the diameter of a proton in a 4 
kilometer interferometer arm – something which a large number of scientists said would 
never work.  It was the remote chance that the impossible would be made possible before I 
died that kept me going along with pleasure in the company of the honest, larger than life, 
and sometimes slightly mad characters who thought it was worth devoting their lives to it.  In 
other words, for most of the time I was taking the role of a native and that is what made the 
whole thing viable.  And when I saw what was happening in the first few days after 
September 14th I was seeing it as a native and loving it as native – wallowing in realism – a 
realism that carried all the way through to the press conferences on 11th of February when the 
secret was announced to the world: ‘We have detected gravitational waves; we’ve done it.’ 
But the job of the sociologist, and certainly the job of the methodological relativist, is also to 
step back – to see the same world from the estranged perspective.  Why do people, such as 
you dear reader, believe any of it?  Just why is this gravitational wave detection different 
from all other gravitational wave detections?  And what use would it be to say because ‘this 
time it is real’.  The answer has to be in terms of why no-one is doubting (I should say, no-
one in the mainstream is doubting).  What has happened here is that, in terms of the title of 
my 1985 book, we have seen ‘the order of things’ changing; from now on when gravitational 
wave research is done it will be done against a different background of taken-for-granted 
assumptions and it will be possible to judge the competence of the experiments by reference 
to their outcomes.  The job of the methodological relativist is to document and try to explain 
that social transformation without reference to reality.   
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